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Abstract: This paper presents a conceptual framework to analyse the redistributive impact of 
transfers in the context of a decentralized economy. The framework is illustrated by means of a 
numerical example that describes an economy with three regions and two levels of 
government―the central level and the regional level.  With this set up, the paper analyses a 
variety of transfer systems and considers its effects on redistribution using as benchmark the 
distribution going on in the centralized version of this economy, in which tax capacity is 
unevenly distributed across the three regions and central government public expenditure is 
distributed across regions according to their population.  
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Regional transfers are normally associated to institutional settings in which 
public decisions regarding expenditure and taxation are decentralized. The most obvious 
case is when superposed to this setting there is an explicit mechanism of 
intergovernmental transfers. Then the operation is easily analysed, and the 
consequences and degree of territorial redistribution achieved readily identified, 
particularly when the transfer system is self-financed. Things get more complicated 
when the transfer system needs resources from the central government, and even more 
when different transfer systems, self-financed or not, coexist with each other. It is 
incorrect to treat each of them as if they were independent. In general, no system can be 
considered in isolation, since they are inextricably linked by the constraint of available 
resources. Even in the simplest case, the redistributive effects of a single transfer system 
will have to be considered all along the territorial effects of the central government 
fiscal policy. And in a centralized economy, in which no sub central governments and 
no transfer system exist, the operation of the central government alone may have well 
defined territorial redistribution effects. 
The purpose of this paper is to present a general analytic framework that allows 
the analysis of all these aspects and can help to measure the redistribution effects 
associated to different institutional settings. We take this framework from a previous 
work of ours (Zabalza and López-Laborda, 2017). In that paper our aim was to measure 
the degree of economic advantage that the special transfer regime applied to the Basque 
Country and Navarre conferred these regions as compared to the common transfer 
regime applied to the rest of Spanish regions. Here we show that, duly reinterpreted, 
that framework is also useful to analyse a much wider set of issues regarding the 
operation of transfers systems, such as those enumerated above. In particular, on the 
formal side, the framework unveils all the regional transfers that effectively operate 
under any given transfer system and makes explicit the interrelations that may exist 
among different regions, and between these regions and the central government. And on 
the empirical side, the framework shows how the degree of regional redistribution can 
be measured. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we formally present 
the general analytical framework to analyse regional transfer systems and in Sections 3, 
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4 and 5 we apply this general framework to different institutional settings, and illustrate 
its operation by means of a simple numerical example. Rather than using actual 
empirical data, we opt for a numerical example to show more clearly the general 
character of the model. Evaluating actual transfers systems requires a non-negligible 
amount of description of the institutional setting, which in a methodological article such 
as this would distract our attention from the theoretical properties of the model and the 
wide range of situations to which it can be applied. Interested readers may consult 
Zabalza and López-Laborda (2017) for a specific empirical application of the model to 
the Spanish regional system of finance, which although not directly focused to measure 
redistribution, illustrates the versatility of this tool. 
Section 3 presents the benchmark case, which corresponds to that of a 
centralized economy. Section 4 discusses the effects of five different transfer systems 
ranging from the canonical Equalization of Fiscal Capacity (EFC) system of transfers to 
a system in which transfers for all regions are defined following the example of the 
present the Spanish foral system applied to the communities of the Basque Country and 
Navarre (special regime transfers), and going through a variety of mixed systems in 
which these two types of transfers coexist with each other. And Section 5 considers two 
particular cases. The first one presents a parametric system of transfers capable of 
generating a continuous range of redistributive effects, and to that extent encompassing 
most of the previous cases. The second analyses a particular proposal put forward in the 
Spanish academic literature to overcome the unequal distributive effects of the foral 
system and shows its limitations. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.   
 
2. A general analytical framework to analyse regional transfers 
2.1 Consolidated budget and intergovernmental transfers 
Following Zabalza and López-Laborda (2017), consider the consolidated budget 
of an economy composed of n regional governments (indexed by i, where i goes from 1 
to n) and a central government (indexed by c). For simplicity, we disregard 
governments different from those of the central and regional levels. We also 
contemplate the existence of debt finance, although restricted only to the central 
government. The consolidated budget is: 
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 i c i c
i i
E E T T D+ = + +∑ ∑ ,  (1) 
where iE  and iT  are normative expenditure (expenditure needs) and tax revenue (tax 
capacity) of the n regional governments ( )1 ... i n= , cE  and cT  normative expenditure 
and tax revenue of the central government, and D  the deficit incurred by the central 
government in normative terms. We assume for simplicity that cE  is all non-divisible 
public expenditure and cT  central government tax revenue whose regional origin is 
known. All variables are exogenous (normatively given) except D . 
Rewrite (1) as follows: 
 ( ) ( )i i c c
i
E T E T D− = − − +∑ .  (2) 
The left hand side of (2) shows the sum of the discrepancies between normative 
expenditure and tax revenue for the n regional governments. These discrepancies can be 
positive or negative depending on the particular relation between  and i iE T . Suppose, 
for concreteness, that there exist a transfer system that equates fiscal capacity (EFC), 
(Musgrave, 1961; King, 1984). Under the EFC transfer system, the final amount of 
normative resources that region i will have at its disposal, iR , is the sum of the region’s 
normative tax revenue, iT , and the transfer it receives from the system, iS . That is, 
 i i iR T S= +  . (3) 
iS  is defined as 
 i i iS E T= −  , (4) 
 and iE , the normative expenditure of region i, is 
 i iE Eα
∗=   (5) 
where iα  is the population share of region i , i iN Nα = , and E
∗  the aggregate of 
normative expenditure over all regional governments. Thus, as expression (6) shows, 
the amount of resources that the EFC system of transfers puts at the disposal of each 
region is iEα
∗ :  
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 ( )*i i i i i i iR T S T E T Eα α ∗= + = + − =   (6) 
Call the sum of iR  over all regions R∗ . Then, form (6) 
 i i
i i
R R E Eα∗ ∗ ∗= = =∑ ∑  
or 
 R E∗ ∗= . 
Consistently with the assumed balance of regional governments, normative resources 
are equal to normative expenditure. 
Also from (6), dividing by iN  we have 
 i i
i i
R N E E
N N N N
∗ ∗
= =  
Thus, the EFC transfer system distributes total resources according to population and 
thus equates the amount of resources per unit of need, i iR N , to E N
∗  for all regions. 
The sum ( )i ii E T E Tα ∗ ∗ ∗− = −∑  is the Vertical Fiscal Gap of the system, VFG
, where T ∗  is the total tax capacity of the regions, iiT T
∗ =∑ . The VFG  measures the 
shortage between the total normative expenditure of the regions and their total tax 
capacity, and formally can take the following different forms: 
 ( ) ( )i i i i i
i i i
VFG E T E T E T Sα∗ ∗ ∗= − = − = − =∑ ∑ ∑   (7) 
If E T∗ ∗> , the aggregate net transfer goes from central to regional governments; and if 
E T∗ ∗< , from regional to central government. 
2.2 Transfers between levels of government 
Expression (2) above is the basic relationship we will use to represent the 
transfers that may exist between levels of government. Substituting (7) into (2) we have: 
 ( )c cVFG E T D+ − = .  (8) 
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The sum of the Vertical Fiscal Gap and the balance arising from the specific activity of 
the central government (that is, the balance before transfers to other Administrations) is 
equal to the public deficit of the economy. The left hand side of (8) measures the 
shortage (if it is positive) or surplus (if it is negative) of the economy. The right hand 
side, the public deficit of the economy, measures the increase in debt when there is a 
shortage or the decrease in debt when there is a surplus, which the economy will have to 
undertake. 
We have assumed above that after the transfer system regions cannot have 
deficit. Thus the public deficit of the economy, D, must also be the public deficit of the 
central government considering not only its specific activity but also the management of 
the regional transfer system. Expression (8) is therefore the overall central government 
budget, where net expenditures are cE VFG+  and tax revenue is cT . 
 ( )c cE VFG T D+ − =   
cE  is therefore the central government expenditure on the specific non-divisible public 
goods over which this Administration has responsibilities and excludes the net 
aggregate transfer to or from the regions. However, if we want to concentrate on the 
different flows of resources between levels of government, (8) is the appropriate form to 
use, where the VFG is the regional deficit, if positive, or regional surplus, if negative, 
and c cE T−  is the central government specific deficit or the central government specific 
surplus. By specific we mean the central government balance excluding the VFG (that 
is, excluding transfers between levels of government).  
The sign and magnitude of D will depend on the sign and magnitude of the VFG 
and the balance c cE T− . The VFG can be zero, positive or negative. If it is zero, the 
regional transfer system as a whole is balanced; that is, total normative expenditure is 
equal to total tax capacity, E T∗ ∗= . This does not necessarily imply that each individual 
region is balanced; it only means that for some regions expenditure needs exceeds tax 
capacity, while for others the opposite is true, and that the sum of the positive regional 
transfers are equal to the sum of the negative regional transfers. In this case we say that 
the regional transfer system is self-financed. If the VFG is positive, E T∗ ∗> , there is an 
overall regional deficit which must be financed with a transfer from the central 
government to the regions. And if the VFG is negative, E T∗ ∗< , there is an overall 
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regional surplus which generates a transfer from the regions to the central government. 
In our model all regional transfers are conducted through the intermediation of the 
central government. 
c cE T− , the central government specific balance can also be zero, positive or 
negative. If zero, central government specific expenditure equal tax capacity, c cE T= , 
and this level of government does not generate any additional financial claim. If 
positive / negative, ( ) ( ) /  c c c cE T E T> < , an additional central government specific 
deficit / surplus is also generated. 
Table 1 shows the nine basic cases that result from the combination of these 
alternatives. It also shows that two of these nine cases, case 6 and case 8, generate three 
particular outcomes each. Thus, in total, we have thirteen possible cases. 
The first three cases, Group A, corresponding to the three alternatives in which 
the regional transfer system is self-financed, are the easiest to analyse. Case 1 depicts a 
perfectly balanced economy. The regional transfer system is self-financed, 0VFG = , 
and the central government specific balance is also in equilibrium, 0c cE T− = . Thus, 
using (8), the public deficit of the economy is zero, 0D = . There is no need of extra 
resources from the private sector (in addition to those obtained by taxation). And cases 
2 and 3 are variants of case 1 with, respectively, a deficit and a surplus in the central 
government specific fiscal activity. Then the public deficit of the economy is equal to 
c cE T− , which means that the economy has a public deficit in case 2 and a public 
surplus in case 3. 
The second group, Group B, corresponds to those cases in which the regional 
transfer system generates a positive VFG. That is, the regional aggregate tax capacity is 
not sufficient to finance the aggregate amount of expenditure needs, E T∗ ∗> , and a 
transfer from the central government to the regions, equal to precisely the VFG, is 
needed. This is probably the most frequent case in actual transfer systems. Case 4 is 
complemented with an equilibrated specific central government balance, 0c cE T− = ,  
so the public deficit of the economy is the VFG, D VFG= . And case 5 considers a 
central government that generates an additional specific deficit, so the public deficit of 
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the economy is the sum of the deficits of the two levels of government, 
( )c cD VFG E T= + − . 
Table 1 
    Intergovernmental transfers and economy-wide public deficit 
A map of alternatives       
Case  VFG   c cE T−     D   Conditions 
Group A 
    1 0 0 0 
 2 0 + + 
 3 0 – – 
      
Group B 
    4 + 0 + 
 5 + + + 
 6.1 + – 0 ( )if c cE T VFG− − =  
6.2 + – + ( )if c cE T VFG− − <  
6.3 + – – ( )if c cE T VFG− − >  
     
Group C 
    7 – 0 – 
 8.1 – + 0 ( )if c cVFG E T− = −  
8.2 – + + ( )if c cVFG E T− < −  
8.3 – + – ( )if c cVFG E T− > −  
9 – – – 
 VFG: Regional Vertical Fiscal Gap 
  Ec - Tc: Central Government specific balance 
 D: Economy-wide public deficit 
   
Case 6 contemplates a positive VFG and a negative central government deficit 
(that is, a central government surplus). These two opposite signs make the final effect 
on the public deficit of the economy dependant on the relative strength of the regional 
deficit and the central government surplus. The public deficit of the economy will be 
zero if the absolute value of the negative central government deficit is the same as the 
VFG, ( )c cE T VFG− − = ; greater than zero if ( )c cE T VFG− − < ; and less than zero if 
( )c cE T VFG− − > . These are respectively the cases 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 shown in Table 1. 
Finally, the third group, Group C, corresponds to the rather unusual situation in 
which the regions generate a negative VFG. This can only occur if the tax capacity 
ceded to the regions is sufficiently large relative to their expenditure needs so as to 
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generate an aggregate negative VFG or, what is the same, an aggregate regional surplus. 
The cupo system applied in Spain to the Navarre and Basque Country regions would be 
relevant examples of this type of regional surplus. 
Cases 7 and 9 are the easiest to analyse. In case 7, the regional surplus coexists 
with a balanced central government specific budget and therefore the public deficit of 
the economy is also negative and equal to the VFG, D VFG= . The economy as a whole 
generates a surplus and thus reduces its debt. In case 9 both levels of government 
generate a surplus, and thus the public deficit of the economy is also negative, and equal 
to the sum of the VFG and the central government specific surplus, 
( )c cD VFG E T= + − . 
Case 8, as case 6, combine two opposite signs: in this particular instance, a 
regional surplus and a central government specific deficit. The final effect on the public 
deficit of the economy depends on the relative strength of these two forces. The public 
deficit of the economy will be zero if the absolute value of the VFG is the same as the 
central government specific deficit, ( )c cVFG E T− = − ; greater than zero if 
( )c cVFG E T− < − ; and less than zero if ( )c cVFG E T− > − . These are respectively the 
cases 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3 of Table 1. 
2.3 Regional redistribution. The measurement of pure redistribution 
The above identifies the redistribution that goes on between levels of 
government, but not the redistribution of resources between regions. For that, in 
addition to the transfer system, we have to take into account the territorial incidence of 
the central government specific fiscal activity. 
Under the assumptions of the model, both cE  and cT  can be either traced back 
or imputed to each of the n regions. So, from (2), disaggregating cE  and cT  into their 
regional components we have: 
 ( ) ( )i i ci ci
i i
E T E T D− = − − +∑ ∑   (9) 
or 
 ( ) ( )i ci i ci
i
E E T T D+ − + =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦∑ ,  (10) 
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where ciE  is the central government expenditure located in or imputed to region i and 
c cii
E E=∑ . ciT  is the central government revenue raised in region i and c ciiT T=∑ . 
i ciE E+  is the total public expenditure located and imputed to region i: expenditure 
undertaken by the own regional government plus that undertaken by the central 
government. Thus it makes sense to call this sum the total amount of public expenditure 
located or imputed to region i, tiE , where ti i ciE E E= + . Following a similar reasoning, 
the total amount of tax revenue obtained from region i is ti i ciT T T= + . Therefore, using 
these two new definitions, the consolidated public constraint of the economy is: 
 ( )ti ti
i
E T D− =∑ ,  (11) 
where the difference ti tiE T−  is the net overall transfer of region i , iOS . The difference 
it itE T−  integrates both the effect of the EFC transfer and the fiscal activity of the 
central government. 
If the public sector is balanced, ( ) 0it iti E T− =∑ , then the set of these overall 
transfers (which will normally be positive and negative) is sufficient to define the 
degree of pure redistribution going on in this economy. We call this, the degree of 
economy-wide pure redistribution. 
Observe also that, since i
i
D D=∑ , (11) can be rewritten as follows: 
 ( )ti ti i
i i
E T D− =∑ ∑   (12) 
from where it follows that: 
 i i
i i
OS D D= =∑ ∑   (13) 
The overall transfer of region i , iOS , is therefore both a measure of how the 
redistribution of resources affects region i , and a measure of the contribution of this 
region to the public deficit of the economy. 
For simplicity, in this paper we will measure territorial redistribution at a public 
deficit of the economy equal to zero, 0D = . None of the results obtained below are 
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affected by this assumption. All of them would follow for a positive (or negative) 
deficit. What is important, however, is that, in order to make the results of different 
scenarios strictly comparable between them, the level of D  is the same in all our 
simulations, particularly if we are interested in arriving at a quantitative measure of the 
degree of pure redistribution. And it simplifies the presentation significantly to assume a 
nil deficit for the economy. We will see below that not all cases we want to discuss are 
balanced; that is, not all scenarios end up with 0D = . When this situation arises, we 
impose the condition 0D =  and define the case so that, while maintaining the transfer 
systems under analysis, the above restriction is fulfilled. We illustrate this approach 
below, for the particular cases in which it is needed. 
It is important to notice that when the public deficit is zero, necessarily the total 
normative expenditure of the economy ―that is, the normative expenditure of the three 
regions plus the normative expenditure of the central government― must be equal to 
the total tax revenue of the economy. This can be easily seen starting from expression 
(1). Let us call the total normative expenditure of the economy E  ―that is, 
i cE E E= +∑ ― and the total normative tax revenue T , where i cT T T= +∑ . Then 
expression (1) reduces to E T D= +  and if 0D =  it must be the case that .E T=    
Finally, in addition to 0D = , in all cases, we also keep unchanged the total 
normative expenditure of the economy, the total tax revenue obtained (that is, we keep 
constant the tax effort of the economy) and the regional distribution of tax capacity (that 
is, the regional distribution of income). 
   
3. The model at work: centralized economy 
3.1 Description of the economy 
Following López-Laborda (2004), we consider an economy with three regions: 
R1, R2 and R3. As shown in Table 2, all regions have the same population, 100 
inhabitants each. R1 is the least productive one, with 1,000 monetary units (mu) of 
output, while R2 and R3, 5.5 times more productive than R1, have an output of 5,500 




Table 2    
Economy’s data 
 
Y N Y/N 
R1 1,000 100 10 
R2 5,500 100 55 
R3 5,500 100 55 
Total 12,000 300 120 
 
 
3.2 Centralized economy 
We explore first the extent of regional redistribution in the context of a 
centralized economy. This is not the purpose of the paper, but it will be useful as a 
benchmark for other decentralized institutional settings that we explore below. 
Suppose public expenditure is 10% of GDP. Half of it can be territorialized and 
is regionally distributed according to population, which is the measure of regional needs 
used by the Government. The other half corresponds to non-divisible government 
services, which for the purpose of the present exercise we assume it can be imputed to 
regions also in terms of population. The government revenue is also 10% of GDP, 
which is obtained by a proportional income tax, with a tax rate equal to 0.1. Therefore, 
the government runs a balanced budget. 
What does the general analytical framework developed above has to say about 
the redistributive properties (if any) of this centralized economy? 
Table 3 
     Centralized economy. Consolidated budget (Monetary units, mu)   
Panel A 
     Consolidated budget         
 
R1 R2 R3 CG=R1+R2+R3 Consolidated 
iE   400 400 400 1,200 1,200 
iT   100 550 550 1,200 1,200 
iS   300 -150 -150     
 ( )i iOS D   300 -150 -150  0  0 
EWR (%) 25.0         









Expenditure per capita (mu/N) 
   
 
R1 R2 R3 
  
 
4.0 4.0 4.0 
  Regional economic advantage (%) 




R2 R1 vs. R3 R2 vs. R3 
  
 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
              
D: Deficit; S: Regional transfer; OS: Overall transfers; EWR: Economy-wide redistribution. 
 
In this economy, by definition, there are no regional governments and thus
( )0,  1,2,3i iT E i= = = . Therefore, expression (10) takes a very simple form that only 
involves the regional incidence of central government expenditure and tax revenue: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 2 2 3 3c c c c c cE T E T E T D− + − + − =   (14)  
Under the above assumptions, 1 2 3 400c c cE E E= = = , 1 100cT =  and 2 3 550c cT T= = . 
Therefore, the numerical version of (14) is: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )400 100 400 550 400 550 0− + − + − =  
or 
 300 150 150 0− − =   (15) 
As Panel A of Table 3 shows, the central government runs a balanced budget, 
with 1,200 1,200 0c cD E T= − = − = . Therefore, the three overall territorial transfers are 
necessarily self-financed, and the economy needs no additional finance from outside the 
public sector. The overall transfers to R1, R2 and R3 are, respectively, 300 mu, -150 mu 
and -150 mu. R1 is the net recipient of resources, for an amount of 300 mu, which can 
be thought of as financed by R2 and R3 to the tune of 150 mu each. In this scenario, the 
economy redistributes 300 mu out of a total amount of resources of 1,200 mu. The 
degree of economy-wide pure redistribution is therefore 25%, [=(300/1,200)*100]. All 
regions have at their disposal 4 mu per unit of need. Under the assumptions here 
maintained, all regions are equally treated by the central (and only) government as far as 
the provision of public goods and services is concerned.  
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In what follows we will take this as the benchmark to evaluate the degree of 
redistribution generated by different regional finance systems. It may seem odd to take 
as benchmark a situation which redistributes among territories 25% of the public 
resources available. But, under the assumptions of this specific example, this is a mere 
implication of the public expenditure policy of this government, which is no other than 
to provide all regions with the same resources per unit of need, in a context of 
significant heterogeneity regarding the territorial distribution of income. And we must 
convene that, for a centralized economy, the policy objective of ensuring an equal 
provision of resources per unit of need across the national territory is not uncommon. 
 
4. The model at work: decentralized economy 
4.1 Equalization of Fiscal Capacity (EFC) transfer system 
Suppose now that the economy is decentralized in the following manner. The 
total amount of divisible public expenditure, 600E∗ = , is the responsibility of three 
regional governments instituted in the three regions, and the central government takes 
responsibility of the non-divisible part of public expenditure, 600.cE =  Regarding 
normative tax revenue, regional governments are given half the tax capacity, which is 
defined by a proportional 5% tax on income that yields in total 600 mu ( )600T ∗ = , and 
the central government also taxes income by a 5% proportional rate, with 600cT =  . 
Thus the two levels of government are balanced. For the aggregate of the three regional 
governments the VFG is zero, 
 600 600 0VFG E T∗ ∗= − = − = ,  
and so it is the central government specific balance, 
 600 600 0c cD E T= − = − = . 
This is precisely the Case 1 of Table 1, where there is full balance in all government 
levels of the economy. The transfer system is self-financed, the central government is 





     EFC transfer system 
    (Monetary units, mu)         
Panel A: Consolidated budget 
 
R1 R2 R3 CG Consolidated 
iE   200 200 200 600 1,200 
iT   50 275 275 600 1,200 
iS   150 -75 -75 0 0 
 ( )i iOS D  300 -150 -150 0 0 
EWR (%) 25.0         
      Panel B: Transfer system 
    Expenditure per capita (mu/N) 
   
 
R1 R2 R3 
  
 
2.0 2.0 2.0 
  Regional economic advantage (%) 
   
 
R1 vs. R2 R1 vs. R3 R2 vs. R3 
  
 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
  
      Panel C: Whole economy 
    Expenditure per capita (mu/N) 
   
 
R1 R2 R3 
  
 
4.0 4.0 4.0 
  Regional economic advantage (%) 
   
 
R1 vs. R2 R1 vs. R3 R2 vs. R3 
  
 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
              
D: Deficit; S: Regional transfer; OS: Overall transfers; EWR: Economy-wide redistribution. 
 
Given the figures of regional income shown in Table 2, the three region’s 
normative tax revenue are as follows: 1 2 350 and 275T T T= = = . On the other hand, the 
three EFC regional transfers, i i iS E Tα
∗= − , are: 1 200 50 150S = − = ; and 
2 3 200 275 75S S= = − = − . Therefore, the normative expenditure of the three regions, 
i i iE T S= + , are:  1 50 150 200E = + =  and 2 3 275 75 200E E= = − = . After the operation 
of the EFC transfer system, all three regions, despite their different tax capacity, end up 
with sufficient resources, 200 mu each, to just finance their respective normative 
expenditure. 
The EFC transfer, i i iS E Tα
∗= − , may give the impression that regional 
governments have very little discretion in the management of their budget. But account 
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must be taken that all the values considered here are normative values and that, 
depending on the manner in which expenditure and tax responsibilities are defined, 
actual levels of expenditure and tax revenue may differ from normative levels if these 
governments are prepared to apply a fiscal policy that differs from the normative one. In 
this paper we restrict ourselves to the analysis of transfers in normative terms. That is, 
we assume that regional governments and the central government do not deviate at all 
from their assigned normative levels of expenditure and tax revenue.  
Regarding the regional incidence of the central government fiscal activity, under 
the assumptions here maintained, we have that 1 2 3 200c c cE E E= = = , 1 50cT =  and 
2 3 275c cT T= = . 
Differently from the case of the centralized economy, now the overall transfers 
are the consequence of both regional and central government effects. We thus take 
expression (10), which for the three regions described here reads: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
3 3 3 3                                    
c c c c
c c
E E T T E E T T
E E T T D
+ − + + + − +⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
+ + − + =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
  
And in numerical terms: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
200 200 50 50 200 200 275 275
                                        200 200 275 275 0
+ − + + + − +⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
+ + − + =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
 
which reduces to 
 300 150 150 0− − = .  
As in the centralized economy, a balanced decentralized economy with an EFC transfer 
system will display a set of overall transfers for R1, R2 and R3 respectively equal to 
300 mu, -150 mu and -150 mu. Taking into account the fiscal activity of the regions and 
the central government, this scenario redistributes 300 mu out of a total of 1,200 mu. 
Therefore, the degree of economy-wide pure redistribution is 25% [=(300/1,200)*100], 
the same as that of the centralized economy. This is shown in Panel A of Table 4. 
The EFC transfer system puts at the disposal of the three regions the same 
amount of resources per unit of need: 2 mu.  And when the fiscal activity of the central 
government is taken into account, the result is, as in the centralized economy, 4 mu to 
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each region. So a decentralized economy with an EFC transfer system has the same 
redistributive effects as a  completely centralized economy, providing that in both cases 
the aims of the central government is to distribute resources among regions according to 
their relative needs (see Panels B and C of Table 4). 
4.2 “Mixed Transfer System 1”: R1 and R2 under EFC, and R3 under an 
“equalizing special regime” 
Zabalza and López-Laborda (2017) use their model not so much to identify 
measures of redistribution, but rather to exploit a duality result regarding the way in 
which transfers can be measured. In particular, we note that expression (10) above can 
be rewritten in the following manner: 
 ( ) ( )i i ci i ci
i i
D E E T T= + − +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦∑ ∑ ,  (16) 
or 
 ( ) ( )i i ci i ciD E E T T= + − +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ . (17) 
Expression (16) gives directly the n regional components in which the total public 
deficit can be decomposed. And expression (17) provides the definition of the 
contribution of region i  to the total public deficit. 
Given that i
i
D D=∑ , expression (9) can also be expressed as follows: 
 ( ) ( )i i ci ci i
i i
E T E T D− = − − −∑ ∑ ,  (18) 
where iD  is defined in (17). By construction the n parentheses on the left hand side of 
(18) are pairwise identical to the n parentheses on the right hand side. Then, given that 
by (4) the parentheses on the left hand side are the EFC transfers, it follows that these 
transfers can be defined either as the simple difference between the normative 
expenditure and tax revenue of the region, i iE Tα
∗ − , or by the negative of an expression 
that from the expenditure that the central government makes in the region, subtracts the 
tax revenue that it raises and the public deficit generated in this same region. That is, 
( )ci ci iE T D− − − . Then: 
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 ( ) ( )=i i i ci ci iS E T E T Dα ∗= − − − −   (19) 
In the present scenario we use this duality result to define a mixed transfer 
system, which we call “Mixed Transfer System 1”, composed, among other variations 
respect to the previous scenario, of the two alternatives offered by expression (19). 
Concretely, R1 and R2 remain under the EFC transfer system and an “equalizing special 
regime” is applied to R3. By “special regime” we mean that R3 is given a higher level 
of fiscal autonomy than R1 and R2. To simplify, suppose that R3 is given the whole tax 
capacity of the region, so that the Central Government does not raise any tax revenue in 
that territory. By “equalizing” we mean that despite this high tax capacity, and despite 
that the transfer is defined differently from that of R1 and R2, R3 ends up having the 
same resources per capita as those enjoyed by R1 and R2. In particular, the transfer 
corresponding to R3 is defined as the expression after the second equality sign of (19). 
The two types of transfers of the “Mixed Transfer System 1” are: 
 
( )
( )3 3 3 3
     1,2i i i
c c
S E T i
S E T D
α ∗= − =
= − − −
  (20) 
Regarding tax revenue, R1 and R2 have the same levels as those of the previous 
scenario (Section 4.1), but R3 and CG change. Under the ECF system, R3 raised 
0,05*5,500=275 and the CG raised in the R3 territory also 0,05*5,500=275. Now, R3 
raises 0,1*5,500=550 and CG does not raise any tax revenue in R3 territory. There is a 
275 mu shift in tax revenue out of GC and into R3, which does not alter the total tax 
revenue raised in the economy, that remains at 1,200 mu. 
The transfers of R1 and R2 are the same EFC transfers of the previous scenario. 
Namely, the R1 transfer is 150 mu and that of R2 -75 mu. But the transfer of R3 is now 
given by the second expression of (20) and it is instructive to detail its calculation. 3cE  
is one third (R3’s population share) of total central government expenditure; that is 
(1/3)*600=200. 3cT  is zero, since under the new assumption, the central government 
does not raise any tax in R3’s territory. And following expression (17), and recalling 
that under the new assumption R3 collects all taxes in its territory, 3D  is -150 mu 
[=(200+200)-(550+0)]. This makes ( )3 200 0 150 350S = − − + = −  mu. The “equalizing 
special regime” transfer is such that the expenditure that R3 can finance, 3 3 3E T S= + , is 
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the same as that of R1 and R2 with their EFC transfers despite its larger tax capacity 
and the different formula of its transfer. Indeed, with the “Mixed Transfer System 1” the 
normative expenditure of the three regions are: for R1, 1 50 150 200E = + = ; for R2, 
2 275 75 200E = − = ; and for R3, 3 550 350 200E = − = . 
Table 5 
     Mixed transfer system 1* 
    (Monetary units, mu)         
Panel A: Consolidated budget  
 
R1 R2 R3 CG Consolidated 
iE  200 200 200 600 1,200 
iT  50 275 550 325 1,200 
iS   150 -75 -350 275 0 
 (= )i iOS D   300 -150 -150  0  0 
EWR (%) 25.0         
      Panel B: Transfer system 
    Expenditure per capita (mu/N) 
   
 
R1 R2 R3 
  
 
2.0 2.0 2.0 
  Regional economic advantage (%) 
   
 
R1 vs. R2 R1 vs. R3 R2 vs. R3 
  
 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
  
      Panel C: Whole economy 
    Expenditure per capita (mu/N) 
   
 
R1 R2 R3 
  
 
4.0 4.0 4.0 
  Regional economic advantage (%) 
   
 
R1 vs. R2 R1 vs. R3 R2 vs. R3 
  
 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
              
* R1 and R2 under EFC transfer, and R3 under "equalizing special regime" transfer. 
D: Deficit; S: Regional transfer; OS: Overall transfers; EWR: Economy-wide 
redistribution. 
 
As Panel A of Table 5 shows, an important difference between the present 
“Mixed Transfer System 1” and the previous EFC transfer system is that while the latter 
is self-financed (it corresponds to case 1 in Table 1), the former generates an important 
negative VFG, that is, an important positive transfer for the central government (it 
corresponds to case 8.1 in Table 1). The three R1, R2 and R3 transfers are, respectively, 
150, -75 and -350. This sums -275. The regional system as a whole contributes to the 
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central government 275 mu. With this, R2 and R3 compensate the central government; 
R2 for the excess tax capacity over its normative expenditure, and R3 also for the 275 
mu higher tax capacity that this particular transfer system bestows on this region. 
And it is precisely this positive transfer what allows the central government to 
complement its remaining 325 mu tax revenue, in order to finance the 600 mu 
expenditure needs it has. So, we have a scenario in which the public sector is balanced 
overall, thanks to the existence of a sizeable vertical transfer between the two levels of 
government. Panel A of Table 5 shows the budget of the three regions, that of the 
central government and the consolidated budget of the whole economy. 
We turn now to the evaluation of the overall set of transfers, so that the degree of 
pure redistribution of the whole economy can be assessed. In the present scenario, 
expression (10) yields the following numerical form: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
200 200 50 50 200 200 275 275
                                            200 200 550 0 0
+ − + + + − +⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
+ + − + =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
  
where, as compared with the previous scenario, we note the difference of the last 
parenthesis due to the cession to the regional government of R3 of the whole tax 
capacity of the region. Despite this difference, the final overall set of transfers turns out 
to be the same as that of the EFC transfer system: 
 300 150 150 0− − =  
Therefore, we conclude that the degree of pure redistribution of the “Mixed Transfer 
System 1” is the same as that of the EFC transfer system; namely, 25% 
[=(300/1,200)*100]. 
Despite the negative VFG generated, Panel B of Table 5 shows that the transfer 
system of this scenario puts at the disposal of all the regions 2.0 mu per unit of need, 
and Panel C that when the fiscal activity of the central government is considered this 
figure increases to 4.0 mu per unit of need. So, as it is the case with the EFC transfer 
system, the “Mixed Transfer System 1” distributes resources equally among regions. 
In this exercise we do not enter into the efficiency cost of the different systems 
of transfers. In fact we assume away any such cost. But if the implementation of 
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transfers, even if between different government levels, involves the consumption of 
resources, then the mixed system of transfers examined in this section would be more 
expensive to run than the EFC transfer system due to the sizeable vertical transfer from 
the regional to the central levels of government (275 mu) that this scenario presents. 
This suggests that placing the whole tax capacity in the regional level, which is the 
defining characteristic of the “special regime”, may not be a reasonable course of 
action. We believe that tax decentralization improves the fiscal responsibility and 
autonomy of the regions, but it is difficult to justify that the extent of this 
decentralization should go that much further than the limit set by their total normative 
expenditure. 
4.3 “Mixed Transfer System 2”: R1 and R2 under EFC, and R3 under an 
“non-equalizing special regime” 
Suppose now that the situation is the same as that discussed in the previous case, 
only that now R3, instead of paying the “equalizing special regime” transfer represented 
by expression (20), pays a significantly smaller transfer, which we call the “non-
equalizing special regime” transfer. This lower or “non-equalizing special regime” 
transfer is defined as follows: 
 ( )3 3 c cS E T Dβʹ ʹ ʹ= − − −   (21) 
The “non-equalizing special regime” transfer has the same structure as the 
“equalizing special regime” transfer defined in expression (20) but with significant 
differences, that are meant to represent the real cupos that are applied to the two Spanish 
foral communities ―Basque Country and Navarre. The first one is that the three 
elements within the parenthesis of (21), central government expenditure, central 
government tax and central government deficit, rather than being directly referred to the 
R3 territory, are referred to the national equivalent of those items. Second, the 
measurement of cE ʹ is the specific expenditure of the central government budget minus 
the expenditure in that budget that corresponds to responsibilities ceded to R3. In our 
particular example, since there is a clean division between territorialized expenditure 
and non-divisible expenditure, and the central government only has responsibilities for 
non-divisible expenditure, the central government expenditure does not include any 
expenditure that corresponds to the responsibilities ceded to R3. Therefore, in our 
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model, cE ʹ is equal to cE . Third, cT ʹ  is the amount of revenue obtained by the central 
government with those taxes not ceded to R3. In our model, to make things extreme and 
more visible, we have assumed that under this “special regime” all taxes have been 
ceded to R3. Therefore, in the central government budget there is no revenue coming 
from taxes that have been not ceded to R3, so 0cT ʹ = . And fourth, the national 
equivalents that appear within the parenthesis of (21) are scaled down to the dimension 
of R3 by multiplying this parenthesis by an imputation coefficient that we take it to be 
the R3 tax capacity share. 1 As we shall presently see, with (21), which under the 
particular conditions described above reduces to 
 3 3 cS Eβ= − , (22) 
R3 has a negative transfer of lower absolute value than with the “equalizing special 
regime” transfer (20). That is, R3 has to pay a lower “cupo”, to use the terminology of 
the foral Spanish system. 
If it pays a lower cupo, R3 will have more resources to spend and, other things 
equal, the deficit of the economy will increase. This poses two problems. The first is 
that with a positive deficit a figure for the degree of redistribution strictly comparable to 
those obtained in previous exercises cannot be found. The second is that the assumption 
that everything else remains the same can hardly be sustained. So we must find an 
approach so that the operation of these two transfer systems is constrained to a zero 
public deficit. Since what we are interested in is the study of territorial redistribution as 
a result of different transfer systems, the most natural assumption to make is to 
distribute the absorption of the excess of resources assigned to R3 equally, in 
proportional terms, between R1, R2 and CG. By doing this, while we reduce the 
resources available to these three jurisdictions, we keep constant their relative needs. 
Call ( ) 0 1µ µ< <  the common multiplicative factor that reduces the normative 
expenditure of R1, R2 and CG so that 0D = . Then, if 1E , 2E and cE  are the initial 
																																								 																				
1 In the two real cupos, the imputation coefficients approximate the GDP share of corresponding foral 
communities (Basque Country and Navarre). These coefficients were established in 1981 for the Basque 
Country cupo, and in 1990 for the Navarre cupo. Since those dates, none of the two cupos has been 
updated. See Zabalza and López-Laborda (2017). 
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levels of normative expenditure (200 mu, 200 mu and 600 mu respectively) it must be 
the case that 
 ( )1 2 3 1,200cE E E Eµ µʹ+ + + =   (23) 
where 
    3 3 3 3550c cE T E Eβ µ β µʹ = − = −   (24) 
We can easily find the reduction required by substituting (24) into (23) and solving for 
µ  to obtain 
 
( ) ( )3 1 2
650 0.89655






The effort that R1, R2 and CG have to make in order to absorb the increase in the 
expenditure of R3 is ( )1 µ−  per cent; that is, a 10.345 % reduction of their respective 
levels of normative expenditure. 
 Table 6 presents the results of this new scenario. As postulated, the normative 
expenditure of R1, R2 and CG is 10.345% lower than in the equalizing “Mixed Transfer 
System 1” shown in Table 5, and the public deficit is zero. Also, it is easy to verify that 
the non-equalizing transfer of R3, expression (22), yields the -247 mu figure shown in 
the table, significantly lower (in absolute terms) than the -350 mu of Table 5. The 
“cupo” of R3 is therefore much more generous to R3 than the one that would yield 
equality, and therefore the expenditure of R3 raises from 200 mu to 303 mu. This excess 
is financed with lower transfers for R1 and R2 (129 mu and -96 mu versus 150 mu and -
75 mu in Table 5) and with the lower vertical transfer that the CG receives (213 mu 
versus 275 mu in Table 5).   
Regarding the overall transfers, the numerical form of expression (10) for this 
particular scenario is: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
179.3 179.3 50 50 179.3 179.3 275 275
                                            303.4 179.3 550 0 0
+ − + + + − +⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦





 258.6 191.4 67.2 0− − =   
 
Table 6 
     Mixed Transfer System 2* 
    (Monetary units, mu)         
Panel A 
     Consolidated budget         
 
R1 R2 R3 CG Consolidated 
iE   179 179 303 538 1,200 
iT   50 275 550 325 1,200 
iS   129 -96 -247 213 0 
 ( )i iOS D=   259 -191 -67 0 0 
EWR (%) 21.6         
      Panel B: Transfer system 
    Expenditure per capita (mu/N) 
   
 
R1 R2 R3 
  
 
1.8 1.8 3.0 
  Regional economic advantage (%) 
   
 
R1 vs. R2 R1 vs. R3 R2 vs. R3 
  
 
0.0 0.0 69.2 
  
      Panel C: Whole economy 
    Expenditure per capita (mu/N) 
   
 
R1 R2 R3 
  
 
3.6 3.6 4.8 
  Regional economic advantage (%) 
   
 
R1 vs. R2 R1 vs. R3 R2 vs. R3 
  
 
0.0 0.0 34.6 
              
* R1 and R2 under EFC transfer, and R3 under a "non-equalizing special regime" transfer. 
D: Deficit; S: Regional transfers; OS: Overall transfers; EWR: Economy-
wide redistribution. 
  
Therefore, the degree of pure redistribution of the “Mixed Transfer System 2” is 21.5% 
[(=258.6/1,200)*100]. As would be expected from the equalizing nature of the “Mixed 
Transfer System 1” scenario, the redistributive potency of the non-equalizing “Mixed 
Transfer System 2” scenario is significantly lower. It goes down from 25.0% to 21.5%. 
Finally, Panels B and C report the amount of resources per unit of need that each 
region enjoys after respectively the consideration of only the mixed transfer system 
(Panel B) and the consideration of both the transfer system and the central government 
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fiscal activity (Panel C). As Panel B shows, the strong non-equalizing nature of the 
present particular mix puts at the disposal of R3 3.03 mu per unit of need compared 
with only 1.79 mu for R1 and R2, thus generating an economic advantage of R3 versus 
R1 and R2 of 69.2%.2 Things improve somewhat after considering the additional fiscal 
presence of the central government. Then, as indicated in Panel C, the comparison 
between R3, on the one hand, and R1 and R2, on the other, is 4.83 mu per unit of need 
versus 3.59 mu per unit of need, and economic advantage of R3 respect the other two 
regions of 34.6%. 
4.4 R1, R2 and R3 under an “equalizing special regime” 
From Section 4.2 we know that the transfer generated by the “equalizing” 
special regime is exactly the same as that of the EFC system. One would be excused to 
think that, because of this fact, there is no need to consider the case in which all regions 
are under the “equalizing special regime” because its results must be identical to the 
case in which all regions are under the EFC transfer system, which has already been 
considered in Section 4.1. However, this is not quite so because the “special regime”, in 
comparison with that of the EFC system of transfers, moves a certain degree of tax 
capacity from the central government to the regional governments. To see what is going 
on more clearly, and consistently with what we have assumed for R3, we make here the 
extreme assumption that all fiscal capacity is ceded to all the three regional 
Governments, thus leaving the central government with no tax revenue of its own and 
totally dependent on the transfers coming from the regions in order to finance its 
expenditure responsibilities. Therefore, the three regions tax their respective base at a 
10% rate: R1 obtains 100 mu, and R2 and R3, 550 mu each. 
The three “equalizing” transfers that correspond to this case are: 
 ( ) ( )          1,2,3i ci ci iS E T D i= − − − =   (25) 
																																								 																				
2 Zabalza and López-Laborda (2017) estimate the economic advantage of the Basque Country and 
Navarre respect the average of the fifteen autonomous communities of the common regime in 29.8% and 
28.2% respectively, a much lower figure that the 69.2% figure obtained here. But, apart from the 
extremely stylized exercised carried out in this paper, account has to be taken of the much larger relative 
importance of R3 in our illustrative example than that of the Basque Country and Navarre respect the rest 
of Spanish autonomous communities. In our example R3 generates one third of the total GDP, while in 
2016 the Basque Country represented 6.2% and Navarre 1.7% of Spanish GDP.   
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Under the maintained assumptions, ( )200 and =0,  1,2,3ci ciE T i= = . And the 
contributions of the three regions to the public deficit of the economy are obtained 
evaluating numerically expression (12): 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )




200 200 100 0 300
200 200 550 0 150




= + − + =
= + − + = −
= + − + = −
 









200 0 300 100
200 0 150 350




= − − − =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
= − − − − = −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦




     All regions under "equalizing special regime" 
  (Monetary units, mu)         
Panel A 
     Consolidated budget         
 
R1 R2 R3 CG Consolidated 
iE   200 200 200 600 1,200 
iT   100 550 550 0 1,200 
iS   100 -350 -350 600 0 
 ( )i iOS D=   300 -150 -150 0 0 
EWR (%) 25.0         
      Panel B: Transfer system 
    Expenditure per capita (mu/N) 
   
 
R1 R2 R3 
  
 
2.0 2.0 2.0 
  Regional economic advantage (%) 
   
 
R1 vs. R2 R3 vs. R1 R3 vs. R2 
  
 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
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Panel C: Whole economy 
Expenditure per capita (mu/N) 
   
 
R1 R2 R3 
  
 
4.0 4.0 4.0 
  Regional economic advantage (%) 
   
 
R1 vs. R2 R3 vs. R1 R3 vs. R2 
  
 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
              
D: Deficit; S: Regional transfer; OS: Overall transfers; EWR: Economy-wide 
redistribution. 
 
Using all this information, Panel A of Table 7 presents the consolidated budget 
of the economy. Normative expenditure turns out to be 200 mu for all three regions: A 
system with an “equalizing special regime” transfer for all regions gives exactly the 
same results as those of the EFC system of transfers of Section 4.1. However, when we 
compare Tables 7 and 4, we see that the form in which these same final results are 
obtained differ significantly. The main difference is that under the “special regime” the 
central government is left with no resources of its own, so that a net aggregate transfer 
from the regions of 600 mu is needed for that level of government to finance its 
expenditure responsibilities. And this is precisely the end to which the three 
“equalizing” transfers are directed. R1 still has a positive transfer (that is, it obtains 
money from the system), even if smaller than the one of the EFC system (100 versus 
150 mu). And R2 and R3 have a negative transfer (that is, they pay money to the 
system) of a much larger absolute value than in the case of the EFC mechanism (-350 
versus -75 mu each). In total, then, the system of transfers provides a vertical transfer to 
the central government of 600 mu (=-100+350+350) with which to finance its 
expenditure responsibilities. This scenario is also an example of case 8.1 in Table 1: a 
negative FVG of equal absolute value as the specific deficit of the central government, 
the excess of cE  over cT .  
Taking now into account the added effect of the fiscal activity of the central 
government, we find that the numerical form of expression (10) is: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
200 200 100 0 200 200 550 0
                                        200 200 550 0 0
+ − + + + − +⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦





 300 150 150 0− − =  
This is exactly the set of overall transfers of the EFC transfer system and 
therefore the degree of pure economy-wide redistribution is also 25% 
[=(300/1,200)*100]. 
Panels B and C confirm that the results regarding the amount of resources per 
unit of need is the same for all regions, both after the transfers system, and under the 
joint effect of the transfer system and the fiscal activity of the central government. As 
we would expect given that this system has the same effects as the EFC system, all 
region are equally treated. There is no economic advantage for any of them. The only 
difference with respect to the EFC transfer system is the huge negative VFG that the 
present scenario generates, due to the cession of all the tax capacity to the regions.  
 
4.5 R1, R2 and R3 under the “non-equalizing special regime” 
In this section we consider the case in which the “non-equalizing special 
regime” is generalized to all regions. This means that the three regions have all the tax 
capacity of the economy and the tax revenue of the central government is zero. Then, if 
to make this case comparable with the previous ones, the public deficit has to be zero, 
0D = , knowing that the whole of this deficit is generated in the central government, it 
must be the case that the negative of the VFG ―that is, the negative of the sum of the 
three regional transfers― must be equal to the specific expenditure of the central 
government, cVFG E− = . This again is a scenario that corresponds to Case 8.1 in Table 
1 for 0cT = . 
Since the public deficit of the economy is zero and the central government raises 
no taxes in the regions, generalizing expression (21) we see that the transfers of the 
three regions take all of them a very simple form, namely: 
 ( ) ( )                       1,2,3i i cS E iβ= − =   
Therefore, normative expenditure, i i iE T S= + , is: 
 ( ) ( )                       1,2,3i i i cE T E iβ= − =   



















ˆ100 0.083 600 100 50 50
ˆ550 0.4583 600 550 275 275







= − = −
= − = −
= − = −
= − = − =
= − = − =
= − = − =
  
Panel A of Table 8 shows that under the “non-equalizing special system”, since 
all the tax capacity is ceded to the regions, all three of them, including R1, the poor one, 
have to contribute to the finance of the 600 mu expenditure of the Central Government. 
With the corresponding transfers, the Central Government can finance its expenditure 
responsibilities (50+275+275=600), and its public deficit, which is also the consolidated 
deficit of the economy, is zero. In terms of the amount of normative expenditure that the 
system assigns to the regions, R1 is left with only 50 mu while R2 and R3 have 275 mu 
each. See that the regional distribution of normative expenditure follows exactly the 
distribution of tax capacity: R2 and R3 have 5.5 times more resources than R1, which is 
exactly the ratio in which productivity of R2 and R3 stands with respect to productivity 
of R1.  
Table 8 
     All regions under the "non-equalizing special regime" 
  (Monetary units, mu)         
Panel A 
     Consolidated budget         
 
R1 R2 R3 CG Consolidated 
iE   50 275 275 600 1,200 
iT   100 550 550 0 1,200 
iS   -50 -275 -275 600 0 
( )i iOS D=   150 -75 -75 0 0 
EWR (%) 12.5         
      Panel B: Transfer system 
    Expenditure per capita (mu/N) 
   
 
R1 R2 R3 
  
 
0.50 2.75 2.75 
  Regional economic advantage (%) 
   
 
R3 vs. R1 R2 vs. R1 R3 vs. R2 
  
 




      Panel C: Whole economy 
    Expenditure per capita (mu/N) 
   
 
R1 R2 R3 
  
 
2.50 4.75 4.75 
  Regional economic advantage (%) 
   
 
R3 vs. R1 R2 vs. R1 R3 vs. R2 
  
 
90.0 90.0 0.0 
              
D: Deficit; S: Regional transfer; OS: Overall transfers; EWR: Economy-wide 
redistribution. 
The overall transfers of this economy ―expression (10)― are: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
50 200 100 0 275 200 550 0
                                            275 200 550 0 0
+ − + + + − +⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
+ + − + =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
 
or 
 150 75 75 0− − =   
In net terms the taxpayers of R2 and R3 contribute 75 mu each to finance a net 
transfer of 150 mu in favour of R1. A degree of pure redistribution of 12.5% 
[=(150/1,200)*100], half the size of that obtained with the “equalizing special regime” 
for all regions considered in the previous section. 
As Panels B and C show, the final amount of expenditure per unit of need that 
this system assigns to R1 is particularly low: 0.5 mu per capita, as compared with 2.75 
mu per capita each that R2 and R3 obtain; an economic advantage of R2 and R3 over 
R1 of 450%. As it happens with the totals examined above, resources per capita are 5.5 
times greater in R2 and R3 than in R1; normative expenditure per capita is fully guided 
by regional relative productivity. After the intervention of the central government 
budget, this inequality is somewhat mitigated: R1 has 2.50 mu per unit of need, as 
compared with 4.75 mu for R2 and R3. Now the economic advantage of these two 
regions is reduced to 1.9 times, which means that they still enjoy 90% more resources 
per capita than R1. 
The two “special regimes” considered in this paper, one of which ―the “non-
equalizing” variety― is an approximation to the actual way in which the two Spanish 
foral communities are financed, cannot be generalized without causing havoc among the 
great majority of the Spanish autonomous communities. And for the same reason, they 
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cannot be extended to other rich communities such as Madrid and Catalonia. Also, there 
is no point in having a system which leaves the central government without direct 
means to finance the non-divisible services of which it is responsible, particularly when 
some of them (for instance, macroeconomic management) may need resources at short 
notice and in volumes not foreseen in the normative design of the transfer system. And 
finally, it is absurd that the level of government that, on occasions and unexpectedly, 
may need to incur in considerable amounts of debt, has not capacity to tax the fiscal 
base of the economy. 
 
5. Two special cases 
5.1 Maximum to minimum redistribution via a parametric system of 
transfers 
In the context of the discussion about the degree of equalization, Zabalza (2017) 
argues that if inequality is desired, is best to be transparent about it and suggests a 
parametric system of transfers which can generate any degree of equalization. This is 
achieved by making the degree of equalization to depend on a parameter that mitigates 
the potency of the horizontal transfers associated to the canonical EFC model. A 
subjective parameter that is both explicit and political. 
In this section we show how the “non-equalizing special system” of Section 
4.5 can be replicated in terms of this parametric model. This offers an alternative which 
is not only simpler, but also more susceptible of application since one of the most 
cumbersome features of the “special systems”, namely the cession of all (or of a 
significant part of) the tax capacity to the regions, is not needed at all. 
Given the assumptions of our decentralization model, the transfers of the 
three regions are given by the following expressions (adapted from Zabalza, 2017, 
expression 26):  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 1 2           1,2,3i i i iS E T iα ρβ ρ α= − + − =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦   (26) 
where 2E  and 2T  are the total normative expenditure and normative tax revenue 
assigned to the three regions, ρ  is the political parameter and the rest of the notation 
has already been introduced. 
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If 1ρ = , then from (26) the transfers are: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )2 2           1,2,3i i iS E T iα β= − =    
which are the transfers of the EFC model that generate total equality of resources per 
unit of need. This can be seen more easily looking at the amount of normative 
expenditure that the system assigns to the region, which equals the sum of the normative 
tax revenue and the transfer i i iE T S= + , which for the above iS  reads: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 2 2 2      1,2,3i i i i iE T E T E iβ α β α= + − = =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦    
The normative expenditure assigned to the regions is distributed according to needs. 
There is complete equalization (as in Australia). This is exactly the EFC transfer system 
discussed in Section 4.1 and will not be repeated here. 
If 0ρ = , then we go to the opposite end of the range of redistribution. 
Using (26) and recalling that for 0D = , T E= , the transfers are zero for all regions: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )2 2 =0,          1,2,3i i iS E T iα α= − =    
and the normative expenditure assigned to the regions is totally determined by tax 
revenue: 
 ( ) ( )2      1,2,3i iE T iβ= =    
As far as the system of transfers is concerned, there is no redistribution at all. Each 
region spends according to the tax revenue it normatively collects (as it happens, for 
example, in the USA)3. This is the result obtained in Section 4.5, where we analyse the 
effects of a system in which all regions are under the “non-equalizing special regime” 
transfers. However, as we shall see, there is an important difference that justifies the 
explicit consideration of this particular model: whereas the “non-equalizing special 
regime” system of transfers requires the displacement of a huge amount of fiscal 
capacity between the two levels of government (from central to regional level), the 
																																								 																				
3 Although in the USA, since the mid-eighties, there is not a general system of unconditional equalization 
transfers from the Federal Government to the States, such as the ones we are considering in this paper, we 
should not forget the existence of powerful programs of conditional transfers with an equalization 
component both from the federal government to the states (as in the area of health) and from states to 
local governments (as in education) (Fox, 2007). 
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parametric model with 0ρ = , achieves the same final outcome without such 
displacement. 
Table 9 presents the results of the parametric model. The final results are exactly 
the same as those shown in Table 8 for the “non-equalizing special regime”. However, 
the present model does not displace half the tax capacity of the nation from the central 
government to the regional governments, and thus avoids the need to generate negative 
transfers (cupos) so that the central government can finance its expenditure 
responsibilities despite not having tax resources of its own. This comparison is 
interesting, because it highlights one of the most absurd features of the “special 
regime”, which is the placement of practically all (in our simplified illustration, all) tax 
capacity in the hands of regional governments. 
Table 9 
     Decentralized economy. R1, R2 and R3 under "Parametric system" (ρ=0) 
(Monetary units, mu)         
Panel A 
     Consolidated budget         
 
R1 R2 R3 CG Consolidated 
iE   50 275 275 600 1,200 
iT   50 275 275 600 1,200 
iS   0 0 0 0 0 
 ( )i iOS D=   150 -75 -75 0 0 
EWR (%) 12.5         
      Panel B: Transfer system 
    Expenditure per capita (mu/N) 
   
 
R1 R2 R3 
  
 
0.50 2.75 2.75 
  Regional economic advantage (%) 
   
 
R3 vs. R1 R2 vs. R1 R3 vs. R2 
  
 
450.0 450.0 0.0 
  
      Panel C: Whole economy 
    Expenditure per capita (mu/N) 
   
 
R1 R2 R3 
  
 
2.50 4.75 4.75 
  Regional economic advantage (%) 
   
 
R3 vs. R1 R2 vs. R1 R3 vs. R2 
  
 
90.0 90.0 0.0 
              





As Panel A of Table 9 shows, with 0ρ =  the parametric model yields transfers 
equal to zero for all regions. Consequently, the final amount of normative expenditure 
assigned to each region is simply equal to its tax revenue. Here again we find a model in 
which normative expenditure is totally guided by productivity. In terms of Table 1, this 
scenario corresponds to Case 1: the VFG is zero (more than that, all regional transfers 
are zero); the central government specific deficit is zero; and, therefore, the public 
deficit of the economy is zero.  
On the other hand, the overall transfers in this economy ―expression (10)― are: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
50 200 50 50 275 200 275 275
                                     275 200 275 275 0
+ − + + + − +⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
+ + − + =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
 
or 
 150 75 75 0− − =   
In net terms the taxpayers of R2 and R3 contribute 75 mu each to finance a net overall 
transfer of 150 mu in favour of R1. A degree of pure economy-wide redistribution of 
12.5 % [=(150/1,200)*100] exactly the same as that of the previous section. 
Panels B and C report the patterns of normative expenditure per unit of need 
generated by this scenario, which are the same as those shown in Table 8. The transfer 
system is non-equalizing, with R2 and R3 having 5.5 times more resources than R1. 
Resources are guided by productivity. And after the territorial incidence of the central 
government fiscal activity has also been considered, they have 1.9 times more 
resources. 
 
5.2 A “Pseudo Equalizing Special Regime” 
The significant economic advantage that the “non-equalizing special regime” 
has over the EFC transfer system in the “Mixed Transfer System 2” has in the past 
elicited proposals to eliminate, or at least mitigate, this advantage by making the 
beneficiaries to participate in the financing of the VFG of the regions under the EFC 
system. Regarding the Spanish “foral” system and, in particular, the advantage that the 
Basque Country and Navarre enjoy over the other Spanish regions under the “common” 
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system, these proposals have been discussed, for example, in Sevilla (2001), Castells et 
al. (2005), Monasterio (2009) and de la Fuente (2011). 
In terms of our model this means that the transfer of the “non-equalizing special 
regime” (21) has to be redefined as follows: 
 ( )3 3 1 2c cS E S S T Dβ= − + + − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦    
which, given the assumptions of this particular case, 0cT =  and 0D = , reduces to 
 ( )3 3 1 2cS E S Sβ= − + +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦   (27)    
Two initial comments worth considering are the following: 
First: If the purpose is to eliminate the economic advantage of R3, there is a 
much more direct and effective way of achieving this goal by adopting the “equalizing 
special regime” that we have presented above in Section 4.2. It is possible to have a 
mixed transfer system in which some regions operate under the EFC system and others 
under a “special regime” that concedes much larger tax autonomy to the regions, and 
that allows to calculate the transfer in the indirect manner of expression (20). And we 
have shown that, despite fulfilling all these particularities, such mixed system (the 
“Mixed Transfer System 1”) would deliver exactly the same results as those of a 
straight EFC system for all regions. 
And second: The proposal reflected in (27) defines the transfer to one particular 
region in terms of the transfers of the rest of the regions, which is odd in terms of the 
concept of transfer. A set of transfers is a system that corrects for some underling 
disequilibrium between expenditure and revenue. Therefore the definition of a transfer 
is bound to be closely linked to the particular disequilibrium that needs to be corrected, 
not to other discrepancies in the system. 
As in Section 4.3, we note that if R3 obtains through (27) more resources than 
the ones associated to the equalizing special transfer, and we want to keep the public 
deficit of the economy at zero, then R1, R2 and CG will have to compensate for this 
increase accepting a decrease in its normative expenditure. We make here the same 
assumption as that employed in Section 4.3: we distribute the absorption of the excess 
of resources assigned to R3 equally, in proportional terms, between R1, R2 and CG. So, 
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while we reduce the resources available to these three jurisdictions, we keep constant 
their relative expenditure needs. 
Calling now ( ) 0 1η η< <  the multiplicative factor that reduces the normative 
expenditure of R1, R2 and CG, if 1E , 2E and cE  are the initial levels of normative 
expenditure it must be the case that 
 ( )1 2 3 1,200cE E E Eη ηʹ+ + + =   (28) 
where 
 ( )3 3 1 2550 cE E S Sβ ηʹ = − + +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦   (29) 
and 
 1 1 1S E Tη= −   (30) 
 2 2 2S E Tη= −   (31) 
Substituting (30) and (31) into (29) and the resulting expression into (28), and solving 

















The effort that R1, R2 and CG have to make in order to absorb the increase in the 
expenditure of R3 is ( )1 η−  per cent; that is, a 7.5 % reduction of their respective levels 
of normative expenditure. 
Table 10 presents the results of the “Pseudo Equalizing Special Regime” 
(PESR). The normative expenditure of R1, R2 and CG is 7.5 % lower than in the 
equalizing “Mixed Transfer System 1” shown in Table 5, and the public deficit is zero. 
Also, it is easy to verify that the non-equalizing transfer of R3, calculated according to 
expression (29), is effectively -275 mu. As in Section 4.3, the transfer of R3 is lower in 
absolute terms than the one that would yield equality and therefore the expenditure of 
R3 increases from 200 mu to 275 mu. This excess is financed with lower transfers for 
R1 and R2 (135 mu and -90 mu versus 150 mu and -75 mu in Table 5) and with the 
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lower negative VFG that the CG receives (230 mu versus 275 mu in Table 5). We are 
again in Case 8.1 of Table 1. 
Regarding the overall transfers, the numerical form of expression (10) for this 
particular scenario is: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
185 185 50 50 185 185 275 275
                                            275 185 550 0 0
+ − + + + − +⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
+ + − + =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
  
or 
 270 180 90 0− − =   




     "Pseudo Equalizing Special Regime" 
   (Monetary units, mu)         
Panel A 
     Consolidated budget         
 
R1 R2 R3 CG Consolidated 
iE   185 185 275 555 1,200 
iT   50 275 550 325 1,200 
iS   135 -90 -275 230 0 
 ( )i iOS D=   270 -180 -90 0 0 
EWR (%) 22.5         
      Panel B: Transfer system 
    Expenditure per capita (mu/N) 
   
 
R1 R2 R3 
  
 
1.9 1.9 2.8 
  Regional economic advantage (%) 
   
 
R1 vs. R2 R3 vs. R1 R3 vs. R2 
  
 
0.0 48.6 48.6 
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Panel C: Whole economy 
Expenditure per capita (mu/N) 
   
 
R1 R2 R3 
  
 
3.7 3.7 4.6 
  Regional economic advantage (%) 
   
 
R1 vs. R2 R3 vs. R1 R3 vs. R2 
  
 
0.0 24.3 24.3 
            
 * R1 and R2 under EFC transfer, and R3 under "special equalizing regime" transfer. 
D: Deficit; OT: Overall transfers; TSR: Transfer system redistribution; 
 EWR: Economy-wide redistribution. 
    
How do these results compare with those of the “Mixed Transfer System 2” 
scenario? We answer this question with the help of Table 11, where the systems MTS2 
and PESR are compared regarding the pattern, across the three regions, of the overall 
transfers and the levels of expenditure per capita. For reference purposes, the table also 
includes the scenario MTS1 in which R3 has the equalizing special regime transfer (and 
R1 and R2 the EFC transfer) and full equality is achieved. 
Table 11 
    MTS2 and PESR: Performance compared     
 
Overall Transfers (mu)  
   R1 R2 R3 EWR (%) 
MTS1 300 -150 -150 25,0 
PESR 270 -180 -90 22,5 
MTS2 259 -191 -67 21,6 
PSER correction 
(%) 27,5 27,5 27,5 27,5 
     
 
Expenditure per capita (mu/N) R3 
  R1 R2 R3 
Advantage 
(%) 
MTS1 4,0 4,0 4,0 0,0 
PESR 3,7 3,7 4,6 24,3 
MTS2 3,6 3,6 4,8 34,6 
PSER correction 
(%) 27,5 27,5 27,5 29,7 
MTS1: R1 and R2 with EFC transfers; R3 with equalizing special regime transfer. 
PESR: Pseudo Equalizing Special Regime. 
MTS2: R1 and R2 with EFC transfers; R3 with non-equalizing special regime 
transfer. 
 
The PESR corrects the unequal pattern resulting from MTS2, but the correction 
is incomplete if we take as reference the equal pattern associated to MTS1. Regarding 
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overall transfers, and with respect to the values of MTS2, the PESR increases those of 
R1 and R2 and decreases that of R3, thus moving as expected towards the egalitarian 
pattern of MTS1, but of the whole difference between MTS1 and MTS2, the PESR only 
covers 27.5% of it. The same occurs with the Economy-Wide Redistribution index: with 
respect to MTS2, the PESR increases pure redistribution from 21.6% to 22.5%; but this 
only represents 27.5% of the whole distance between MTS2 and MTS1. Regarding 
expenditure per capita, and again with respect to MTS2, the PESR reduces the R3 
economic advantage over R1 and R2 from 34.6% to 24.3%, but the levels of 
expenditure per capita of R1 and R2 are still below those of the equal distribution of 
MTS1. The PESR reduces by almost 10 percentage points the advantage of R3, but as 
shown by the MTS1 row equality of expenditure per capita is achieved when this 
advantage is zero. So the PESR covers only 29.7% of the total reduction needed to 
achieve equality. 
In the context of the Spanish regional finance models, in which R3 enjoys the 
“non-equalizing special regime transfer”, this exercise shows clearly the limitations of 
the PESR solution: the fact that R3 shares in the financing of the cost of the equalization 
applied to the other two regions, does not imply that full regional equalization is 
achieved. As noted by Castells et al. (2005), sharing in the cost of equalization and 
achieving equalization are different things. So we reiterate the conclusion that has been 
advanced above: if for whatever reason the “special regime” transfer is the desired 
system for some regions, full territorial equality can only be obtained if the “equalizing” 
variety of this transfer, presented in Section 4.2 above, is the adopted one.  
 
6. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we have presented a conceptual framework to analyse the 
redistributive impact of transfers in the context of a decentralized economy, and have 
illustrated the use of this framework to analyse the distribution properties of a variety of 
transfer systems applied to a given economy numerically described, divided in three 
regions and with two levels of government ―the central level and the regional level. 
For this purpose, we have used as benchmark the redistribution going on in a centralized 
economy, in which tax capacity is unevenly distributed across the three regions and 




It is useful to review the numerical results obtained with the help of Table 12, 
where in Panel A we consider explicitly the overall transfers, the vertical fiscal gap, and 
the degree of economy-wide redistribution of the transfer systems analysed; and in 
Panel B the regional distribution of public expenditure per capita and the degree of 
economic advantage that some regions may have with respect to others. 
In order to make the results comparable, all transfer systems have been analysed 
holding constant the tax revenue and the level of normative expenditure of the 
economy, the distribution of tax capacity across regions, and the public deficit of the 
economy that in all cases is kept equal to zero. 
Holding the public deficit equal to zero, the transfer systems considered must 
necessarily fall within Cases 1, 6.1 and 8.1 of Table 1. The ones particularly considered 
in Table 12 belong to Cases 1 and 8.1. Although not explicitly shown, however, we also 
discuss below the nature of scenarios that pertain to Case 6.1. 
 
Table 12 
     
Comparison of different systems           
Panel A: Pattern of Overall Transfers (mu) 
    
     
EWR 
Scenario R1 R2 R3 VFG (%) 
1. Centralized economy 300 -150 -150 0 25.0 
2. EFC transfer system 300 -150 -150 0 25.0 
3. Equalizing special regime (ESR) 300 -150 -150 -600 25.0 
4. Mixed transfer system 1* 300 -150 -150 -275 25.0 
5. Pseudo Equalizing Special Regime (PESR) 270 -180 -90 -230 22.5 
6. Mixed transfer system 2** 259 -191 -67 -213 21.6 
7. Non-equalizing special regime (NESR) 150 -75 -75 -600 12.5 
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Panel B: Pattern of Expenditure per capita (mu/N)  
    
R2/R3 
 
    
Advantage Gini 
Scenario R1 R2 R3 (%) coefficient 
1. Centralized economy 4.0 4.0 4.0 0 0 
2. EFC transfer system 4.0 4.0 4.0 0 0 
3. Equalizing special regime (ESR) 4.0 4.0 4.0 0 0 
4. Mixed transfer system 1* 4.0 4.0 4.0 0 0 
5. Pseudo Equalizing Special Regime (PESR) 3.7 3.7 4.6 24.3 0.050 
6. Mixed transfer system 2** 3.6 3.6 4.8 34.6 0.069 
7. Non-equalizing special regime (NESR) 2.5 4.8 4.8 90.0 0.125 
8. Parametric model (ρ=0) 2.5 4.8 4.8 90.0 0.125 
 
VFG: Vertical Fiscal Gap: EWR: Economy Wide Redistribution. 
*   R1 & R2 under EFC; R3 under ESR. 
** R1 & R2 under EFC; R3 under NESR. 
 
Table 12 orders the scenarios according to their degree of economy wide 
redistribution (EWR). As compared with the 25% benchmark of the centralized 
economy, all scenarios either keep the degree of redistribution unchanged or reduce 
redistribution down to 12.5%, half the level of the benchmark. There are three transfer 
systems which insofar as the degree of EWR are undistinguishable from the benchmark: 
the EFC transfer system, the Equalizing Special Regime and the Mixed Transfer System 
1. Their overall transfers are exactly the same as those of the centralized economy (300 
mu are redistributed from the two rich regions, R2 and R3, which contribute 150 mu 
each, to the poor region R1). These transfer systems replicate the assumed territorial 
incidence of the centralized economy and, as shown in Panel B, yield a complete 
egalitarian economy as far as the territorial incidence of public expenditure per capita. 
No region has an economic advantage over any other. A significant difference, 
however, concerns the sizeable Vertical Fiscal Gaps of the Equalizing Special Regime 
(ESR) (-600 mu) and the Mixed Transfer System 1 (MTS1) (-275 mu). In both cases, in 
comparison with the EFC transfer system, the tax capacity of the three regions (ESR) or 
of one of the three regions (MTS1) is substantially increased at the expense of that of 
the central government. And this circumstance compels the generation of an also 
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significant positive transfer to the central government to enable this Administration to 
finance its public expenditure. 
The distinctive feature of the last four scenarios is that, as compared to the 
benchmark, they increasingly reduce the degree of redistribution, and render more 
unequal the distribution of regional public expenditure. As the last column of Panel B 
shows, while the Gini coefficient of the first four systems is zero (full equality), that of 
the last four systems increases from 0.05 for the Pseudo Equalizing Special Regime, to 
0.125 for both the Non-equalizing Special Regime and the Parametric Model. The more 
unequal effect of these transfer systems can be directly traced from the way in which the 
overall transfers and the level of expenditure per capita change. 
This can be seen more clearly in Table 13, which, with respect to full equality, 
shows the gains and losses that each transfer system imparts on overall transfers (Panel 
A) and expenditure per capita (Panel B). Looking first at overall transfers, the table 
shows that all systems consistently reduce the overall transfers of R1 (the poorest 
region) and increase those of R3 (the richest region). Of particular interest are the 
effects of the Mixed Transfer System 2, which is patently designed to favour R3 in 
detriment of R1 and R2. The same conclusions follow from Panel B regarding the 
changes in expenditure per capita. In this case, the figures of the table are even easier to 
interpret than those of panel A to the extent that (allowing for rounding errors) for each 
system the sum of the three changes is zero, thus highlighting the strict redistributive 
character of the present exercise. 
 
Table 13 
   Gains (+), Losses (-) from full equality 
 (Percentages)     
Panel A: Overall Transfers 
    300 -150 -150 
PESR -10.0 -20.0 40.0 
MTS2 -13.7 -27.3 55.3 
NESR -50.0 50.0 50.0 
rho=0 -50.0 50.0 50.0 











Panel B: Expenditure per capita 
  4.0 4.0 4.0 
PESR -7.5 -7.5 15.0 
MTS2 -10.3 -10.3 20.7 
NESR -37.5 18.8 18.8 
rho=0 -37.5 18.8 18.8 
Note: Sign indicates whether region losses (-) or gains (+) 
PESR: Pseudo Equalizing Special Regime 
 MTS2: Mixed Transfer System 2: R1 & R2 under EFC; R3 under NESR 
NESR: Non-Equalizing Special Regime 
 rho=0: parametric model with rho=0 
  
In addition to the constraint of a zero public deficit, this paper has dealt only 
with transfer systems that generate either a zero or a negative Vertical Fiscal Gap. In 
particular, it has dealt with Cases 1 and 8.1 of Table 1. Had we considered, for each of 
the transfer systems, a lower assignment of tax capacity to the regions, we would have 
entered in the Case 6.1 of Table 1. We do not present these results here because there is 
not much to report about them. Indeed, whatever the transfer system, a reduction in the 
tax capacity of the regions (and thus an increase in the tax capacity of the central 
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